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HEZBOLLAH, AL-MANAR, AND THE ARAB REVOLTS DEFIANCE OR 
SURVIVAL? 
Zahera Harb 
 
It was a fine summer’s day on August 15, 2013, when a loud explosion echoed across 
the Lebanese capital Beirut. The civilian neighborhood of Ruweis in the southern 
suburb of Beirut was hit by a car bomb. Soon, the scenes of destruction and violence 
filled the screens of local and international television stations. Twenty-two civilians 
were killed, and more than 290 injured. An unknown Syrian Sunni group named after 
one of prophet Mohammad wives, Aisha Umm-al Mouemeneen, claimed 
responsibility for the bombing. They were sending a message to Hezbollah.   
The southern suburb of Beirut contains several strongholds of Hezbollah (the 
mostly dominant Shi’a group the Party of God), and the televised message clearly 
indicated that the bombing was a response to Hezbollah participating in military 
activities in Syria in support of the Syrian regime. Sectarian tension was on the rise in 
Lebanon. The Ruweis bombing came within less than a month of another bombing 
that hit another neighborhood in the southern suburbs of Beirut—an area highly 
populated with Shi’a Muslims—injuring more than fifty people, with no fatal 
casualties.  
2 
 
Hezbollah rushed to contain the sectarian discourse that began surfacing in the 
Lebanese media. Through its affiliated channel, Al Manar TV, Hezbollah managed to 
channel the angry voices away from targeting the Sunni community in Lebanon 
towards the Tekfirees—Salafi Jihadist extremist groups affiliated to Al Qaeda. 
Hezbollah announced that these attacks would not stop it from battling these Tekfirees 
in Syria. A day after the bombing, the Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan 
Nasrallah announced in a live televised speech on Al Manar TV that Hezbollah’s 
battle in Syria will continue, and that its fight alongside Assad’s regime is far from 
over. He said that he personally was ready to join forces in Syria if necessary.
1
 For 
Hezbollah, the battle in Syria has become a battle of existence—a battle against what 
it identifies as “the Zionist, imperialist anti resistance project” in the region. 
Hezbollah has proved again that it has become fundamentally a non-state regional 
actor and player, and a fully-fledged partner in the Jabhat al-Mumana, the anti 
imperialist anti Zionist rejectionist front that includes Syria and Iran. Some political 
analysts came to see it as a regional actor stuck in the Lebanese politics and not vice 
versa.
2
 Hezbollah has always emphasized the role that Syria and the Syrian regime 
have been playing in supporting the “Islamic resistance” fight against Israeli 
occupation and aggression. Nasrallah has always referred to Syria as “the friend” that 
has never let Hezbollah and the resistance movement down. The strong bond between 
Hezbollah and the Syrian regime goes back to the early days of the party’s existence.3  
This chapter argues that Hezbollah has been consistent in its message of 
“resisting the oppressor” from the early days of the group’s emergence up until its 
                                                          
1
 Hassan Nasrallah, AL Manar, Televised speech on 16.08.2013. URL: 
http://english.almanar.com.lb/seccatpage.php?frid=23&seccatid=14&thirdcatid=101 (accessed 1
st 
November 2013).   
2
 (Hokayem, 2010).  
3
 For more on the history of the relationship see David, Hirst, Beware of Small States, (London, Faber 
and Faber, 2011).     
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controversial participation in the Syrian war. This chapter assesses Hezbollah’s 
politics during and post the Arab revolts. It explores the role that Al Manar TV, the 
station affiliated with the party, played in disseminating the party’s political stand, 
sentiments, and activities. To explore the argument, this chapter starts by giving a 
brief history of Hezbollah and its relationship to Al Manar TV. It investigates 
Hezbollah’s positions towards the Arab revolts, with more attention given to the 
conflict in Syria and its implications on Lebanon, and how those positions were 
translated into Al Manar TV’s coverage. The chapter highlights Al Manar’s coverage 
of the Ruweis bombing as a case that demonstrates how the coverage mirrors the 
consistency in the political and ideological position of Hezbollah. The Lebanese 
‘Party of God’, like other Lebanese parties realised the importance of disseminating 
its messages through dedicated channels and founded its own media platforms.  They 
started Al Nour Radio station in 1988, then Al Manar in 1991. They own al-Intiqad 
weekly publication (formerly, al-Ahd).  Both Al Manar and Al Nour are available to 
Arab Audiences via satellite, in Lebanon overland and to the world via the worldwide 
web in three different languages Arabic English and French.  It also uses other 
traditional methods of communications like billboards, posters, murals
4
 and 
organizing rallies.  All these communication tools mirror the same political and 
ideological message. They tend to serve audiences inside and outside Lebanon. The 
most prominent platform among those listed above is Al Manar. This chapter focuses 
on Al Manar coverage. However, before delving into discussing the coverage of the 
Arab revolts and Syria it is necessary to understand the ideology behind the party and 
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its evolving identity, which reflect the type of messages Al Manar is disseminating to 
its audiences        
Hezbollah’s Evolving Identity 
In the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion into south Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Shiite 
Islamist “Party of God,” was formed. Resisting the occupation was one of the main 
causes that brought several members and religious leaders of different Shi’a political 
movements and groups together to form one party under the auspices of the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, told the 
party’s paper Al Ahd on November 21, 1997, that “had the enemy [Israel] not taken 
this step [the invasion], I do not know whether something called Hezbollah would 
have been born. I doubt it.”5  
A few months after the Israeli invasion, the Shi’a of South Lebanon, who 
constitute the majority of the population there, became aware that the Israelis had 
come to stay, and that they would not leave until they had achieved what they claimed 
to be their objective at the time: uprooting the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) from South Lebanon.
6
 Poignantly, the Israelis initiated a plan, similar to that 
used in the West Bank, to administer the area through committees that were run by 
their proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).
7
 The Israeli army and its allies 
began pressuring prominent figures within the local population to join the scheme by 
taking their relatives as hostages in a camp in the Ansar village near Sidon.
8
 The 
Ansar camp, known as a concentration camp because of its tents and surrounding 
barbed wire, was used to detain without trail those suspected of aiding and abetting 
                                                          
5
  Cited in Amal, Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizb’llah, (London, Pluto, 2002), 11.  
6
  Hala, Jaber, Hezbollah, born with a vengeance, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1997), 15 
and Magnus, Ranstorp, Hizb’ullah in Lebanon, (Basingstock, Palgrave, 1997), 30. 
77
  Jaber, Hezbollah, born with a vengeance, 15. 
8
  Ibid 
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members of the underground resistance movement that was sweeping the villages of 
South Lebanon.
9
 What started as a small group of resistance fighters became a mass 
resistance movement that led to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from major cities and 
towns in South Lebanon.    
In the same year, Hezbollah issued its mission statement, known as “the open 
letter,” officially announcing the emergence of this new party. In this open letter, it 
argued that its friends were the oppressed of the world irrespective of their race, 
colour, or religion.
10
 Hezbollah expressed clear commitment to the concept of the 
welayet al faqih—the Shi’a jurist-theologian who is considered to be the successor to 
the Prophet and the twelfth Imam—introduced by the Islamic revolution of Iran and 
Ayatollah Khomeini.
11
  However, Hezbollah made it clear in its open letter and later 
in its political publications that the party is a Lebanese party and not a foreign Iranian 
body by all means, from its framework to its members.
12
  Hezbollah Deputy Secretary 
General Naim Qassem clarifies in his book, Hezbollah: the Story Within, that the 
commitment to welayat al-faqih does not strip Hezbollah of its independence: 
Such commitment to Jurist-Theologian and his jurisprudence does not limit 
the scope of internal work at the level of forging relations with the various 
powers and constituents of Lebanon. It further does nott limit the sphere of 
regional and international cooperation with groups with whom the Party’s 
strategic direction or concerns meet.
13
 
 
One of Hezbollah’s main objectives stated in the open letter was resisting Israeli 
occupation until it withdrew from the southern Lebanese territories. However, it was 
not until the late 1980s that the Hezbollah’s Islamic resistance gained the upper hand 
                                                          
9
 Clive, Jones, “A reach greater than the grasps: Israeli intelligence and the conflict in South Lebanon 
1990-2000”, Intelligence and National Security, 16:3 (2002): 1-26.  
10
  Joseph, Alagha, Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, 
(Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 16. 
11
  Naim, Qassem, Hizbullah, the Story Within, (London, Al Saqi books, 2005), 19. 
12
 Ibid: 57 
13
 Ibid: 56-57 
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in fighting the Israelis
14
. By the early 1990s, Hezbollah’s “Islamic resistance” became 
the sole force that had the logistic and military capabilities to fight the Israeli 
occupation in South Lebanon.
15
 In 1989, Hezbollah changed its original motto 
displayed on the party flag from “the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” to the “Islamic 
Resistance in Lebanon.”16 Two years later, Hezbollah entered the Lebanese political 
scene taking part in parliamentary elections with an election program that emphasized 
its diverse Lebanese cultural and religious identity. The party won 12 seats in the 
parliament.
17
  
Meanwhile, Israel was finding it difficult to stop the Hezbollah fighters from 
targeting its troops in the occupied zone of South Lebanon on a daily basis. “The 
Islamic resistance,” which was attracting growing support and popularity among the 
local Lebanese population, became Israel’s primary target. Israel’s war against the 
Hezbollah resistance fighters took various shapes and forms: commando operations, 
incursions, and mini-invasions.  
The “Seven Days Operation” of July 1993—code-named “Operation 
Accountability”—and the “Grapes of Wrath” Operation of April 1996 were two major 
attacks Israel launched on the Lebanese territories, targeting Southern villages and 
                                                          
14
With direct political support from the Syrian regime. Syrian regime had its upper hand in Lebanese 
politics post the Lebanese civil war.  
15
 For more information on the emergence, structure and objectives of Hezbollah see Jaber, 1997; 
Ranstorp, 1997; Saad Ghorayeb, 2002; Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, (New York, 
Syracuse University Press, 2004); Judith, Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, the changing Face of Terrorism, 
(London, IB Tauris, 2004) Qassem, 2005; Richard, Norton, Hezbollah, A Short History, (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press,  2009); Hirst, 2011 
16
 Maasri (2012). 
17
 For more on Hezbollah decision to participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections see Augustus 
Richard Norton (2007).  
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cities outside the occupied zone and the main power stations in the capital, Beirut.
18
 
These two events took place in the aftermath of the fifteen-year Lebanese civil war 
when all the Lebanese factions had agreed to put an end to the internal hostilities. 
They met in the Saudi city of Taef and agreed on Lebanon’s right and legitimacy to 
resist the Israeli occupation forces in South Lebanon until Israel implemented UN 
resolution 425.
19
 The Lebanese political leaders participating in the meeting also 
agreed in what became later known as the Taef Accord that Lebanon was to be a 
united Arab state where Muslims and Christians share similar powers. They equally 
rejected all tendencies and attempts towards dividing Lebanon into mini religious 
states,
20
 and declared Israel a state enemy and those who establish contact with the 
Israelis traitors.  
Lebanon’s official/political institutions thus regained their unity and power. 
The Lebanese government declared its support for the Lebanese resistance against the 
Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. It also announced its support for the 
Palestinians’ right to establish a sovereign state in Palestine, and for the right of 
Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.
21
 All the Lebanese governments that 
took office after 1990 recognized the “Islamic resistance” armed struggle against the 
Israeli occupation as a “national resistance.”22 Syria, which was given the upper 
political hand in Lebanon to see this agreement through, offered Hezbollah all the 
                                                          
18
 See Zahera, Harb, Channels of Resistance, Liberation Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media, 
(London, IB Tauris, 2011) 
19
 On March 19
th
 1978 United Nation Security Council adopted Resolution 425, which calls upon Israel 
to withdraw immediately from all Lebanese territory. It also calls for strict respect for the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized 
boundaries. The UN Security Council also decided to establish a peace-keeping interim force for 
Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring 
international peace and security and assisting the Lebanese government of Lebanon in ensuring the 
return of its effective authority in the area (Tueni, 1979).   
20
  Aref, Al Abed, Lebanon and Al Taef, (Beirut, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2001) 
21
  See Aref, Al Abed, Lebanon and Al Taef and Elisabeth, Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, 
(New York, Holmes & Meier, 2002). 
22
  Judith, Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, the Changing Face of Terrorism. 
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logistic and political support it needed in its struggle to resist the Israeli occupation.
23
    
  
After twenty-two years of occupation, Israel made a unilateral withdrawal 
from south Lebanon in May 2000. On the July 24, 2000, the United Nation Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) finally certified Israeli compliance with UN Security 
Council 425. However, there was a small number of issues still unresolved when the 
verification process came to a halt. Among those problems was the issue of Chebaa 
Farms. This was a small piece of land that Israel claimed to be Syrian land according 
to UN resolution 242, yet which Lebanon believes is Lebanese and therefore should 
be liberated from Israeli occupation according to Resolution 425. The resistance 
declared the continuation of its military struggle until such time that Israel withdraw 
from Chebaa Farms, release all Lebanese detainees from Israeli prisons, and stop 
violating Lebanese airspace.
24
 An attempt for prisoner exchange between Israel and 
Hezbollah was the main aim behind capturing two Israeli soldiers from the border line 
between Israel and Lebanon on July 12, 2006.
25
 On the same day, Israel launched a 
disproportionate war against Lebanon claiming that it wanted to destroy Hezbollah.
26
 
However, Israel’s war objectives were not met. Instead, Lebanon’s civil infrastructure 
was destroyed, and Hezbollah and the “Islamic resistance” gained more popularity 
among the Lebanese and Arab populations.
27
  
                                                          
23
  See David, Hirst, Beware of Small States.  
24
  Brendan, O’Shea, “Lebanon’s ‘Blue Line’: a new international borderor just another cease-fire 
zone?”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (2004), 19-30.  
25
  Nasrallah, Hassan, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah speech at the divine victory rally held in Beirut, 
moqawama.org, 22.09.2006. URL: 
http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=709&fid=11 (accessed 25 April 2012). 
26
 See Jeremy Sharon, “Lessons of the 2006 Lebanon war”, The Guardian, 12.07.2010. URL: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/12/lessons-second-lebanon-war/print.  Accessed 
on 21 January 2014).  
27
 According to a poll released by the Beirut Centre for Research and Information, 87 percent of 
Lebanese support Hezbollah’s fight with Israel, a rise of 29 percent on a similar poll conducted in 
February. However, the level of support for Hezbollah’s resistance from non-Shiite communities has 
9 
 
 
The July 2006 War as a Turning Point   
On February 14, 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated in a 
car bomb in Beirut. Blame was immediately targeted at the Syrian regime. Hundreds 
of thousands of Lebanese from different religious sects and political affiliation took to 
the streets of Beirut demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. They 
occupied Martyr Square in downtown Beirut as the center of their protest. Hezbollah 
alongside Syria’s allies in Lebanon arranged a large demonstration under the banner 
“Thank you Syria,” and marched to the adjacent Riyad AL Soluh Square. The two 
squares witnessed substantial demonstrations—one pro-Syrian on March 8, 2005, and 
the other anti-Syrian on March 14, 2005. Hence, the political scene in Lebanon was 
divided into two major alliances known as March 8 and March 14. The predominantly 
Sunni Future Movement headed by Saad Hariri, son of the late Prime ‎Minister Rafic 
Hariri  was the driving-force behind the March 14, alliance, and the ‎predominantly 
Shi’a Hezbollah was the driving-force behind the March 8, camp. ‎ 
This division grew more intense in the wake of the July 2006 war. Although 
the thirty-three days of war showed solidarity among Lebanese people against Israeli 
aggression, the March 14 alliance believed that Hezbollah was acting as an Iranian 
and Syrian proxy agent, and was leading Lebanon into destruction. On the other hand, 
Hezbollah and the March 8 alliance believed that the March 14 group was acting as a 
proxy for Saudi Arabia and liaising with Israel and the United States to destroy 
Hezbollah,. Any trust between the two camps was shattered. Political tensions grew 
                                                                                                                                                                      
increased. Eighty percent of Christians polled supported Hezbollah along with 80 percent of Druze and 
89 percent of Sunnis (Nicholas, Blanford, “Israeli Strikes May Boost Hizbullah Base”, The Christian 
Science Monitor, 28.07.06). 
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and sectarian discourses surfaced in the Lebanese media
28. Hezbollah’s efforts to 
portray a pan-Lebanese, pan-Islamic image were failing. Hezbollah was being 
portrayed as a Shi’a movement and was faced with anti-Shi’a sentiments. Hezbollah 
fighters marching through the streets of Beirut on May 7, 2008, to stop the Lebanese 
government from destroying Hezbollah’s private underground telecommunications 
network set to protect its leaders and its Islamic resistance military activities against 
any Israeli military or intelligence intrusion, fuelled the sectarian sentiments in the 
country.
29
 Domestic political rivalry in Lebanon took the form of Shi’a-Sunni rivalry. 
Indictment of four members of Hezbollah in the assassination of Rafic Hariri by 
United nation backed special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) put Hezbollah in a 
defensive position
30
. The group denied all allegations. Hezbollah believes that it is 
being targeted in an Israeli-US plot to demonize the party and what it stands for.    
The Future Movement usedFuture TV and Radio Orient as their media tools in 
the conflict, and Hezbollah usedAl Manar TV and Radio Al Nour.
31
 Hassan 
Nasrallah, on more than one occasion, praised the role “the resistance media” played 
in portraying “the correct image of the resistance and its fighters.”32 On the 7th 
anniversary of the July 2006 war, Nasrallah spoke of the successful psychological war 
                                                          
28
 See Harb in Matar and Harb (2013) 
29
  Marius, Deeb, Syria, Iran, And Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance And Its War On Lebanon,  (U.S. 
Hoover Institution Press, 2013); See Deeb 2013 to read more about what 14 March alliance called 
‘Hezbollah occupation the streets of Beirut.’ 
30
 The STL trial into Hariri’s assassination started in the Hague on the the 16
th
 of January. For more on 
the trial see Al Jazeera, Hariri assassination opens at the Hague, 16.1.2014. URL 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/hariri-assassination-trial-opens-at-hague-
201411684455392827.html  Accessed on 18.1.2014.  
31
 See Zahera, Harb, “Mediating internal conflict in Lebanon and its ethical boundaries,” in Dina, 
Matar and Zahera, Harb, Narrating Conflict in the Middle East, Discourse Image and Communications 
Practices, (London, IB Tauris, 2013). 
32
 See Nasrallah’s speech, Al Manar website, 9.5.2013. URL:  
http://english.almanar.com.lb/seccatpage.php?frid=23&seccatid=14&thirdcatid=101 (accessed: 1
st
 
November 2013).  
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Hezbollah led against Israel. Al Manar and other media platforms affiliated to 
Hezbollah were central to that success.
33
  
 
Al Manar, the “Channel of Resistance:” Carrying the Message of Defiance   
Al Manar started its transmission on June 4, 1991, from a small apartment in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut. According to former Al Manar’s head of news, Hassan 
Fadlallah, Al Manar started transmitting six hours a day at most through a small 
transmitter that covered the southern suburbs of Beirut.
34
  
The channel was brought to life by a group of Hezbollah enthusiastic young 
men,
35
 with the aim of spreading the resistance’s message and accomplishments 
among the Lebanese public. As stated by both Nayef Krayem (former chairman of Al 
Manar) and Muhamad Haidar (former chairman of Al Manar and member of 
Hezbollah’s Political Bureau), those enthusiastic young men started thinking of the Al 
Manar project as early as 1986:  
In the late eighties the Islamic resistance carried out operations that proved 
painful to Israeli positions in south Lebanon. The media coverage of these 
operations was weak, and the Israelis kept the killing of their soldiers in south 
Lebanon away from the Israeli and international media. They used to 
announce these killings after a day or two, saying that the soldiers had, for 
instance, died in a car accident. It was then that we decided that we needed our 
own publicity tool to uncover the Israeli lies. Thus, we started thinking of 
establishing our own television and radio stations.
36
  
 
Hassan Fadlalah  revealed that the first resistance videotape was broadcast on Tele 
Liban’s Channel 7 in 1986. However, as soon as Al Manar was launched, the tapes 
                                                          
33
 For more information and illustration of this psychological war See Zahera, Harb, Channels of 
Resistance 
34
  Doha, Shames, ‘Al Manar: from the southern suburb to the southern suburb, a channel that disturbs 
the Israelis and the Americans’, Assafir, 24 December 2004, p. 4. 
35
 Nayef, Krayem, ‘Al Manar: Qusat al Tassis…’ [‘Al Manar: the story of its establishment …’], 
Assafir, 28 December 2004, p. 5.  
 
36
 Mohammad, Haidar, Al-Manar former Chairman, Interview with author, Al-Manar headquarters, 
Haret Hreik, Beirut Southern Suburb, 01.09.2004. 
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were sent to the newly established channel. From then on, Al Manar gained its 
reputation of being the “resistance channel.”37 Nevertheless, this reputation was 
confined to the small area its broadcasts then reached, which were mainly Greater 
Beirut and parts of South and East Lebanon.  
Between 1991 and 1996, Al Manar developed its technical abilities and 
transmission powers. In September 1996, the government granted Al Manar a 
temporary licence as “the resistance station.” As such, the duration of the Al Manar 
license was tied to the ending of the Israeli occupation. According to Krayem, this 
was an official admission by the government of the important role Al Manar was 
playing, and of the need for such a channel to portray resistance heroism and 
achievements until the liberation of the occupied territories in south Lebanon.
38
  
There had to be a TV station that committed itself to bringing out images of 
the suffering of our people in the occupied territories, the victims of Israeli 
arrogance, and that of those living in areas bordering the occupation who 
suffer its semi-daily aggressions, besides focusing on the resistance activity 
and establishing its role, hoping to formulate a resistant nation governed by 
justice and equality. Thus, Al Manar saw the light of day.
39
  
 
The Al Manar mission statement indicates the “propagandistic nature” of the channel. 
It was founded on the basis of propagating resistance activities and displaying images 
of Israeli atrocities in south Lebanon
40
. Thus, Al Manar TV was established as the 
resistance’s media tool in its fight with the Israeli army. Television is a popular media 
form and fits with Al Manar’s mission to make resisting the Israeli occupation of 
South Lebanon part of Lebanese people’s everyday lives.41   
                                                          
37
 Doha, Shames, Assafir, 24 December 2004. 
38
 Nayef, Krayem, Assafir, 28 December 2004. 
39
 Al Manar Mission Statement cited in Zahera Harb, Channels of Resistance in Lebanon, Liberation 
Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media.  
40
 See Zahera Harb Channels of Resistance in Lebanon  
41
 Bernadette, Casey, Neil, Casey, Beb, Calvert, Liam, French, and Justin, Lewis, Television Studies: 
The Key Concepts, (London, Routledge, 2002), 88. 
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Meanwhile, Al Manar worked on fulfilling the legal, structural, financial, and 
technical demands needed to obtain a licence to operate as a privately owned 
commercial general television station. The Lebanese Communication Group (LCG) 
was established, with shareholders from different Lebanese religious sects including  
Muslims and Christians.
42
 In July 1997, Al Manar and Radio Al Nour were granted 
full licences under the LCG name,
43
 but were not legally registered until November 
1998.
44
  
After it was granted an official licence, Al Manar began several training 
workshops to equip staff with the most developed techniques in media production. 
Many Al Manar journalists and technicians were sent on training courses in France, 
Syria, Iran, and Egypt. Later, the television station signed an agreement with the 
French Thomson Company to equip Al Manar with the latest technologies.
45
  
By 1997, Al Manar’s terrestrial channel was broadcasting 18 hours a day, and 
was able to reach Lebanon in its entirety, as well as parts of Syria and occupied 
Palestine.. 
46
  
Accordingly, the government granted Al Manar a licence as a “national 
resistance channel in 1998.”47 Between 1993 and 2000, Hezbollah led a very 
successful media campaign against Israel and its occupying forces in south Lebanon 
                                                          
42
 Al Manar, according to its licence application, is run by an independent board of directors. This 
board has members (mainly businessmen and bank managers) who have no organisational ties to 
Hezbollah. However, they support the resistance’s operations in south Lebanon. 
43
 Al Nour, a radio station established by Hezbollah, was later run by a separate board of directors.  
44
  Nayef, Krayem, Assafir, 28 December 2004. 
45
  Ibid. 
46
  Mohammad, Haidar, Al-Manar former Chairman, Interview with author, Al-Manar headquarters, 
Haret Hreik, Beirut Southern Suburb, 01.09.2004. 
 
47
  Zahera, Harb, Channels of Resistance in Lebanon. 
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and Al Manar was a key institution in conducting what I identified in an earlier study 
as “Liberation Propaganda” against Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.48   
On 25 May 2000 (the day South Lebanon was liberated), Al Manar began 
broadcasting via satellite and its audience grew, especially with the channel’s 
extensive coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada. 
Since obtaining its licence from the government in 1998, the channel has 
increased its audience share to more than 15 percent of the Lebanese population. By 
2004, Krayem and other Lebanese officials stated that the channel was the third most-
watched television channel in Lebanon.
49
  
By welcoming speakers from all sectors of the Lebanese population onto its 
programs, Al Manar has tried to identify itself as a television channel fostering inter-
sectarian collaboration. Of importance when taking into account the television ratings 
for the whole of Lebanon is the predominance of Al Manar as a substitution channel 
not constantly watched by non-Hezbollah viewers, but frequently consulted for 
specific programs, especially the news and mainly during times of crisis or military 
escalations.
50
   
A 2008 Zogby poll puts the viewership of al-Manar at 2% of the Arab world, 
which translates to about $10 million. By comparison, al-Arabiya had 9% and 
one of the most popular Lebanese stations, Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation, 3%.
51
 
 
Al Manar succeeded in achieving this position by portraying a television message of 
inter-sectarian collaboration against a common Israeli enemy.
52
  
                                                          
48
  See ibid.  
49
  Victoria, Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese television” in Naomi, Sakr, Women and 
Media in the Middle East, (London, I.B. Tauris, 2004: 162–79), 177–8. 
50
 ibid: 178 
51
  Ann Marie, Baylouni, “Not Your Father's Islamist TV: Changing Programming on Hizbullah's al-
Manar”, Arab Media and Society, 9, Fall (2009). URL: http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=728 
(accessed, 14 January 2013).  
52
 ibid: 179 
15 
 
Throughout the years that followed, Al Manar remained true to its mission 
statement to propagate and defend the Islamic resistance project in protecting the 
nation (the Umma) by confronting and resisting the “Zionist enemy and its imperialist 
friends” plans in the region. As a result Al Manar was listed as a terrorist organisation 
on the US State Department list of terrorist organisation. The act followed a study 
conducted by Avi Jorisch of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy claiming 
Al Manar incites violence and anti-Semitic sentiments in its programming.
53
 On 
similar grounds Al Manar was later banned in France, Spain and Germany. 
 
Hezbollah, Al Manar, and the Arab Revolts: Supporting the “Oppressed” 
Against the “Oppressor” 
Richard Norton states that the ruling elite in the Islamic world “find Hezbollah so 
worrisome, namely that it may inspire copycat dissent movements in their own 
societies.”54 He expressed his belief that this would be the case especially when 
sectarian divisions become less significant, and as pan-Islamic sentiments grow.
55
 
In Saudi Arabia, during the July war, in an attempt to forestall Shi’s-Sunni 
solidarity, the regime reiterated the admonition of some anti Shi’i clerics that 
Saudi Muslims were not permitted to pray for Shi’i Hezbollah.56 
 
During, and in the aftermath of, the July 2006 war, Nasrallah was celebrated as a 
latter-day Salah al-Din (Saladin).
57
 In the minds of many Arabs and Lebanese at the 
time, Nasrallah occupied a “larger than life image.”58 His speeches broadcast on Al 
Manar during the war played a pivotal role in bringing people from across the Arab 
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world in solidarity with the Hezbollah resistance fighters.
59
 Al Manar enjoyed a boost 
in viewership during that period.
60
 The television moved from “83rd to 10th watched 
in the Arab world during the war, according to Israeli sources”.61 According to Anne 
Marie Baylouny Many polls list al-Manar as “one of the top stations in the Middle 
East, particularly for news on Palestine”62 She states that many list al-Manar among 
the top influential outlets in the Arab world. Al Manar and Hezbollah’s increase in 
popularity across the Arab and Muslim world during time of crises crossed the 
sectarian affiliations. Other than Egypt’s success in 1973, “the Party of God” was the 
only player (state or non-state) to have defeated Israel in such a way.
63
 Following the 
Shi’a school of thought within Islam has always been central to the party’s identity. 
However, it has never been demonstrated in the party’s literature or general statement 
to have an exclusive Shi’a policy. As Naim Qassem, deputy secretary general of 
Hezbollah, wrote: 
Following Islam requires a detailed understanding and adoption of a context 
for interpretation. Given the number of Islamic schools of thought, patterns 
chosen by their originators to express their views of the appropriate means for 
achieving abidance by Islamic Sahri’a, one is prompted to follow a specific 
path. The Party thus choose to follow that of the prophet’s descendents; such 
is the general direction of faith adopted by the shi’is.64  
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Aiming towards an Islamic order is part of the party’s commitment to Islamic thought 
and Shi’a ideology, however, its position evolved to one that does not seek to 
implement such order by force. 
The creation of an Islamic state is thus not a function of adoption by one group 
or branch and a subsequent imposition on other groups. Such a path is refused 
both for this project and others, irrespective of who its organisations are… The 
message is clear, and beckons the creation of an Islamic state based on free 
public choice.
65
  
 
On these bases, Strindberg and Warn differentiate between Hezbollah and other 
Islamist parties and groups; they recognize that Hezbollah endorses the idea of 
political pluralism and differences of opinion.
66
 They quote Hassan Nasrallah 
affirming that Hezbollah “do not seek status” and that the “fundamental and central 
cause is that we are fulfilling a duty and that is what governs our conduct.”67 
It was this “fundamental and central cause” that guided Hezbollah’s response 
to the Arab revolts. The party offered support for every uprising in the region except 
for the one taking aim at the Syrian regime.  
Indeed, Hezbollah’s overall response was to not only welcome the uprisings, 
but encourage them. In late April, Ali Fayad [Hezbollah Member of 
Parliament] noted that the events in Tunisia and Egypt were ‘very important 
mixtures of democracy and resistance… revolutions based on demands for 
accountability, transparency.
68
 
 
This support follows the dichotomy of the “oppressor” versus the “oppressed,” which 
Amal Saad Ghorayeb identified as central to Hezbollah’s political stand and action:  
Central to Hizbu’llah’s notion of political action is the division of the world, 
formulated by Khumayni, into ‘oppressors’ (mustakbirin) and ‘oppressed’ 
(mustad’afin). So pivotal is this conceptual dichotomy to Hizbu’llah political 
thought that it is invoked in almost every official’s speech.69 
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Mustakbirin has always been a term affiliated in the party’s literature and statements 
made to the United States and Israel. The support that the party expresses is towards 
the oppressed (Mustad’fin) uprising in these countries against the oppressor that is 
supported by Israel and the United States. 
Al Manar dedicated airtime to broadcast and cover the protests on the streets 
of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya. With the crackdown on Bahraini 
protesters, and the absence of coverage from the main Arab satellite news channels,
70
 
Al Manar became the screen of refuge for Bahraini activists. The Bahraini accusations 
against Hezbollah’s interference in Bahraini internal affairs surfaced along with 
stories of Iranian plots to control the region. Central to these accusations was the 
Shi’a-Sunni divide. Bahrain petitioned the Arab State Broadcasting Union to stop the 
transmission of Al Manar TV and radio Al Nour on the Arabsat satellite transmitter. 
This was in response to what Bahrain and other Gulf states said was Hizbollah’s and 
Al Manar’s role in provoking violence and sectarian hatred. The Lebanese 
government interfered and asked Arab ministers of information meeting in Cairo not 
to ban Al Manar TV and radio Al Nour, stating that both channels operate under 
Lebanese law, which prohibits inciting sectarian or religious hatred.
71
 Hezbollah had 
been making political alliances with other sects since it entered parliamentary 
elections in 1992, and Al Manar reflected this multi-sectarian, multicultural approach 
in it programing and news coverage.  
Such programming, diametrically opposed to popular and Western images of 
Hizbullah as a terrorist organization and its media as a propaganda outlet for 
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violence and Shi’a exclusivism, is a result of Hizbullah’s increasing 
Lebanonization or nationalization[…] Al-Manar is a window into these 
changes, for some more dramatic and perhaps convincing than the 
organization’s political statements and alliances. The television demonstrates 
Hizbullah’s desire to broaden its support and assure its future domestic 
legitimacy within the Lebanese multi-religious community.
72
  
 
On November 8, 2012, Al Manar broadcast a statement by Hezbollah denying 
accusations of involvement in Bahraini events.  
Commenting on the accusations levelled by Samira Rajab, Bahraini state 
minister for media affairs, against Hezbollah, the Hezbollah Media relations 
Department issued a statement noting that the Bahraini authorities continue the 
episode of their accusations and false claims. … Hezbollah denounced “any 
direct or indirect reference to it with regard to this issue.”73  
 
Al Manar did not depict its dedication of air time to support the Bahraini protesters as 
a support based on sectarian affiliation; it was a support based on Hezbollah’s binary 
understanding of the world in terms, of the “oppressor” and the “oppressed.”   
However, during the 90
th
 meeting of the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) in 
Tunis in December 2013, Bahrain requested the union cancels the membership of Al 
Manar.
74
 LCG, the parent company of Al Manar and radio Al Nour, Chairman 
Abdullah Qasir rushed to issue a formal apology to Bahrain over its news coverage
75
.  
The apology confirmed LCG “commitment to adopt objectivity in future coverage of 
news in the Arab world as well as ongoing events and respect professional standards”. 
ASBU members including Bahrain accepted the apology. Bahrain News Agency 
leaked the apology and Arab news networks picked on the contradiction between 
what Al Manar and Hezbollah claim to stand for and the reality of its actions. 
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Hezbollah did not take long to issue a statement renouncing the apology.
76
 The 
statement said that the stance was taken without consultation with the party 
leadership. Almost two weeks later Qasir quit his post as Chairman of LCG. Despite 
that Al Manar apology was not withdrawn hence avoiding, in an act of political 
pragmatism on behalf of both Al Manar and Hezbollah. Dismissal from ASBU and 
losing access to a large number of its own audiences is what Al Manar tried to avoid. 
Al Manar did not stop from hosting Bahraini opposition activists on air, but at a lesser 
scale. By that time news on Syria has had dominated Al Manar news agenda. Al 
Manar moved from being media sympathiser to being a media activist.    
 
Hezbollah and Syria’s War: A Consistency in the Discourse 
The media and political support Hezbollah, and consequently Al Manar, offered to 
protestors and activists in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain came to a halt 
when demonstrations calling for reform began in Syria. Hezbollah’s Secretary 
General Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches at the beginning of the protests called for a 
dialogue between the opposition and the government to address political and 
economic reforms.
77
 However, two years into the conflict, Hezbollah emerged as a 
central political and military ally to the Syrian regime. Criticism and condemnation of 
Hezbollah’s role in Syria dominated the political scene in Lebanon. In an interview 
with the Lebanese daily Assafir, Lebanese President Michael Sulyman warned that 
Hezbollah was exposing Lebanon to internal tensions and Israeli aggression by 
continuing its military campaign in Syria.  
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Hezbollah is a resistance and this resistance has a national day [in Lebanon] 
and it is referred to in the Cabinet’s Ministerial Statement under the ‘Army, 
people and resistance’ slogan. How can Hezbollah therefore act unilaterally, 
leaving the army and people?
78
 
 
Similar voices of opposition to Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria occupied spaces in 
anti-Syrian regime media platformsin Lebanon and the Arab world like Future TV, 
Murr TV, Al Arabyia and Al Jazeera Arabic , and sectarian tensions grew on the 
streets of Lebanon. For Hezbollah, the battle in Syria was a battle of existence—one 
that involves the existence of the Jabhat al-Mumana, the anti Zionist anti Imperialist 
rejectionist front in the region led by Syria and Iran, which Hezbollah has emerged as 
a fully-fledged partner.
79
  
Today, it is widely assured that any success in the dissociation operation of the 
axis of resistance on the military level, by toppling the Syrian regime, won’t 
exclude Hezbollah and some other sides, especially after some previous 
diplomatic efforts to exclude Syria from this axis didn’t bear fruits. 
Hezbollah’s followers are aware the battles trends and its background. This is 
represented by the popular consent about the death of Hezbollah’s martyrs 
who fought off military operations that targeted their villages and properties 
on the borderline.
80
 
 
Hezbollah and Al Manar stress that the struggle in Syria has an international trend 
related to the choices adopted by the Syrian regime on the level of resistance and 
reluctance. They keep emphasizing that the battle in Syria is not about sectarian 
motivation, and that Hezbollah has been the subject of media agitation in Lebanon 
and the Arab world.
81
  
Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah assured that Syria’s 
friends in the region and the world will not let it fall in the hands of America, 
Israel, and Takfiri groups. In a statement via Al-Manar TV Channel, in which 
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he tackled the latest, most significant developments, Sayyed Nasrallah 
renewed his call for everyone to find a political solution for the Syrian crisis.
82
  
  
Stories about the numbers of fighters Hezbollah was sending into the Syrian battle 
emerged in several media outputs in the region and internationally. The British daily 
The Times reported the presence of 10,000 Hezbollah fighters in Syria, with 1,200 of 
them fighting in Qusayr.
83
 The Guardian reported Israeli military intelligence chief 
Aviv Kochavi claiming that Iran and Hezbollah “have built a 50,000 strong force to 
help Syrian regime.”84  Articles doubting and denying the achievements of Hezbollah 
in its war with Israel began dominating spaces in some of the Arab press. Abdallah al 
Rashid, wrote in Al Sharaq- al Awsat, the pan-Arab Saudi paper:  
what is going on in Al Qusayr is only another chapter in Hezbollah bad 
history…calling it Iranian brigade used in Iran’s conflict with the countries of 
the region, including Lebanon… it was media propaganda that made 
Hezbollah look victorious on its battles with Israel, the truth is Israel was the 
victorious one.
85
   
 
Demonizing Hezbollah as a resistance movement was topped by the decision of the 
European Union to classify the “Hezbollah military arm” as a terrorist group.86  
Hezbollah was accused of bombing a bus of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria. Hezbollah 
denied all allegations and accused Israel of running a “global terror campaign to 
isolate the party.”87 The Gulf States warned against the consequences of Hezbollah 
military interference in Syria, and announced that they would take measures against 
the residency permits and financial and commercial transactions of Hezbollah 
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members.
88
 Those measures were directed mainly at Lebanese Shi’a. Stories also 
emerged about Hezbollah’s involvement in terrorist plots in Nigeria and Cyprus.89 
Such stories were followed by news on Hezbollah’s intentions to wage attacks on 
countries in the Gulf region. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al Siyasah Kuwaitiya reported 
that plans have been put in place to build camps for Hezbollah party members on the 
border with ‘Sunni strongholds’ and on the border with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.90 
Al Jazeera led a story on Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr El Qirbi, reporting that 
Hezbollah supported former south Yemeni President Ali Salim al Bid by providing 
him with protection in Beirut. Links were made in the story between the transmissions 
of Al Bid satellite channels to that of Al Manar.
91
 These claims were unfounded, but 
an atmosphere of resentment in the region towards Hezbollah as a “destructive 
regional power” was growing. Hezbollah’s responses to all political and media 
pressure was channelled in the speeches of its secretary general, which has, since the 
July 2006 war, been treated by Al Manar as media events.
92
  
When there is an efficient and serious resistance devoted to confronting the 
enemy, it is natural that it gets targeted. From now on, no one can impose its 
projects and conditions on Lebanon, and Lebanon is no longer a pleasant bite 
for the enemy… no matter who the enemy is.93  
 
The discourse of resistance and anti-US and Israeli imperialism and occupation was 
consistent and dominant in every speech Nasrallah made throughout the Syrian crisis, 
and was reflected in Al Manar’s coverage of events in Syria. Al Manar had its 
reporters embedded with the Syrian army and would broadcast special reports on the 
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Syria army’s ‘advancement’ against what Al Manar refers to as ‘armed and militant 
groups’ threatening ‘the stability and security of Syria’94.   
On July 9, 2013, a car bomb exploded in Bir el Abed in the southern Suburbs 
of Beirut—a Hezbollah stronghold—injuring 53 mostly Shi’a civilians.95 Hezbollah 
blamed Israel for the car bomb and avoided accusing Sunni jihadist groups involved 
in the fighting in Syria.
96
 Al Manar coverage of the explosion and its aftermath 
reflected this stand. “Israel is the only party benefiting from such atrocity” was a 
statement that was featured in all Al Manar news and current affairs programs at the 
time. Hezbollah, through Al Manar, was able to restrain the reaction of its supporters. 
A message of resistance was re-enforced by a speech Nasrallah gave on August 2, 
2013:  
We the Shiites of Ali bin abi Taleb will not abandon Palestine, will not 
abandon Jerusalem… say whatever you want, say rejectionists say terrorists 
say criminals we won’t abandon Palestine… We Hezbollah the Islamic, Shia, 
twelver party will not abandon Palestine, will not abandon Jerusalem, won’t 
abandon the people of Palestine and won’t abandon the sanctities of this 
Ummah.
97
 
 
Nasrallah, for the first time in a televised speech, called for the annihilation of the 
state of Israel. It was a message to indicate that Hezbollah was still faithful to its 
mission statement, and that fighting in Syria was part of fulfilling that mission. 
Hezbollah was soon hit badly on the home front. The conflict in Syria has clearly and 
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violently spilled over into Lebanon. On August 15, 2013, a huge car bomb exploded 
in the civilian neighbourhood of Ruweis in the southern Suburb of Beirut killing 22 
civilians, and injuring more than 290.
98
 In contrast to the first explosion in Bier Al 
Abed a month earlier, an unknown group called Aisha Umm-al Mouemeneen claimed 
responsibility for the bombing in a videotaped message. The name of the group and 
the content of the video indicated affiliation to Sunni Jihadists groups fighting in 
Syria. Al Manar rushed to call it a terrorist attack
99
. Israel was not reported as the 
direct perpetrator, but as the beneficiary of such attacks. Al Manar gave airtime to live 
coverage from the targeted area. Al Manar reporters interviewed people in the 
neighborhood, and phrases like “we don’t want to be dragged into a sectarian strife;” 
“Lebanon is for all Lebanese;” and “the resistance project is the target, but they will 
not be able defeat it,”100 were repeated by the survivors. The reporters took part in 
delivering political statements. “Whoever the perpetrators are, they are playing in the 
hands of Israel, they are Zionist collaborators” said an Al Manar correspondent at the 
scene Abbas Fniesh.
101
 Another reporter, Hamza Al Haj Hassan,
102
 stood amid of the 
destruction the bomb had caused and announced that those “who plotted the crime 
will not win over the resistance.”103 Hezbollah was referred to as “the resistance,” and 
no distinctions were made between the two. There was emphasis on the fact that the 
targeted neighbourhood has residents from different sects, and not just those that 
follow Shi’a Islam. Al Manar reporters conducted interviews in hospitals with victims 
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that are of different sects and come from other Arab countries.
104
 Ziad Waked, a 
Christian and the head of the Haret Hriek municipality, which Ruweis is part of, was a 
guest on several Al Manar shows. He spoke of in the aftermath of the bombing, 
assessing the damages, and what needed to be done to help people get back to their 
homes.
105
 Having Waked as a repeated guest, emphasized the multi-sectarian 
affiliation of the neighborhood. On the morning after the explosion, Al Manar 
broadcast a detailed coverage of how the Israeli press covered the attack. The channel 
reported the joy Israel experienced at having Hezbollah and the “resistance being hit 
by Arab hands.”106 Most of those interviewed on the streets of Ruweis, or in the 
hospitals, sent a message of defiance to the perpetrators. The message was clear: this 
was a terrorist attack conducted by “the terrorists” (the tekfirees). The coverage 
reflected clear commitment to the anti-occupation, anti-imperialism discourse and to 
the dichotomy the oppressed versus the oppressor.    
The same anti-sectarian discourse was dominant when Al Manar rushed to 
cover another car bomb that hit Tripoli in north Lebanon. Two car bombs exploded 
outside two Sunni mosques in the city. At least 47 people died, and more than 500 
were injured.
107
 Hezbollah was quick at denouncing the “crime,” and Al Manar had 
similar intensive live coverage on the scene as that conducted in Ruweis. Messages of 
solidarity started pouring from Ruweis via Al Manar to the people of Tripoli, and a 
logo with the phrase “eternity for the martyrs and prayers for the injured” appeared on 
Al Manar screen.  
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Conclusion  
Hezbollah has emerged as the most influential and most vocal non-state actor in the 
Middle East. Syria’s crisis has shown that Hezbollah has become a regional player 
and, as Hokayem points out, a fully-fledged partner “and not a proxy” 108in the 
rejectionist front.  
 In all its actions and public discourses, Hezbollah has been consistent about its 
image and intentions as a resistance movement that supports the oppressed against the 
oppressors—terms that have been used in Iranian discourses since the Islamic 
revolution of 1979. In the regional power struggle, Hezbollah does not see the Assad 
regime as “the oppressor,” but, along with Syrian people, as “oppressed” by groups of 
takfiris trying hard “to bring Syria and its people to a submissive state in the hands of 
Israel and the Americans.” Throughout its output, Al Manar has been consistent in 
disseminating this message. 
            Fighting the military battle in Syria has not proved to be a difficult task for 
Hezbollah. The difficult task is to regain its reputation and position among the 
Lebanese and Arab populace as the movement of resistance, and the freedom fighter 
model that many Arabs believed in in the wake of July war 2006. The most difficult 
battle that Hezbollah is currently fighting is to de-label its motives in Syria as that of 
national interests (in the interest of the Umma) rather than a sectarian one. Al Manar 
has proved to be an effective medium to disseminate Hezbollah’s anti-sectarian and 
multi-sectarian message. Meanwhile, serious efforts are being made to disseminate a 
message of the need to fight on the side of the Syrian regime “in the interest of the 
Umma” and in support of the ‘oppressed’ against the ‘oppressor’.  
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